



Loar’s Compromised Internalism 
David Pitt 
In a series of subtle and penetrating papers spanning four decades, Brian 
Loar developed a distinctive two-factor theory of mental content.1 On 
Brian’s account, an individual’s conceptual mental states have a kind of 
content that is determined entirely by factors internal to the 
individual—a narrow (“psychological”) content, as well as a kind of 
content that is determined by (natural and) social factors external to the 
individual—a wide (“social”) content. A distinguishing feature of 
Brian’s theory is the foundational role it gives to qualitative 
experience—phenomenology—in the determination of narrow content. 
His guiding insight was that an adequate theory of mental intentionality 
(including mental reference) must take into account the individual’s 
experience of his or her intentional states, from the subjective point of 
view. This is essential to capturing psychological content, which is 
constituted by how an individual “conceives the facts, how he conceives 
the world as being” (Loar 1987, 2017, 165).2 
Brian was thus a pioneer in the research program in analytic 
philosophy of mind that has come to be called “Phenomenal 
Intentionality”. (Brian, (Loar 2003b) was one of the first to use this 
term. See also Horgan and Tienson 2002.) Though a given in the 
Phenomenological tradition, the idea that conscious qualitative 
experience has something to do with conceptual representational 
capacities borders on heretical for most analytic philosophers of mind. If 
Brian (and the Phenomenologists, Horgan and Tienson, and Searle, 
among others) are right, the project of naturalizing intentionality cannot 
proceed without naturalizing consciousness and qualitative 
experience—which is, needless to say, not something that will be 
accomplished by the middle of next week (if it can be done at all). (Jerry 
Fodor proclaimed acceptance of an essential link between intentionality 
and consciousness “intellectual suicide”.3) Though Brian was no dualist, 
he saw clearly that the impossibility of giving a naturalistic explanation 
of consciousness and phenomenology with presently available resources 
did not justify ignoring it or its foundational role in the determination of 
  
intentional content. We should, he thought, “give[] up the idea that 
naturalism requires that intentionality be explicated in objective and 
externalist terms” (1991, 236). Such an explanation may arrive at some 
point in the future; but the theory of content cannot wait for it. The facts 
about intentionality as we experience it are there before us (“there for 
the noticing” (Loar 2003b, 2017, 293)), to be discounted at one’s 
theoretical peril. 
As bold as his insistence on the importance of phenomenology and the 
subjective point of view was, in the face of mainstream analytic 
philosophy of mind and its central commitment to naturalizability as a 
condition of acceptable theorizing, I think Brian did not go far enough. I 
think he was prevented from following his internalist insights where 
they inevitably lead by his acceptance of widely-held views on the 
semantics of singular terms, the sociolinguistic determination of 
conceptual content, and the scope of phenomenality. I think these views 
are either not inevitable, not well motivated, or short-sighted, and, in 
any case, ought to be rejected by anyone who, like Brian, recognizes the 
central role phenomenology plays in the constitution of intentionality. In 
accommodating these views, Brian’s internalism is compromised. 
In this paper, I will focus on the second and third of Brian’s 
compromises, concerning sociolinguistic determination of conceptual 
content, and the restriction of phenomenality to the familiar sensory 
kinds. I will argue that the thesis that an individual’s concepts have 
social content in addition to psychological content is not supported by 
the thought experiments that Brian (like so many others) relies on, in 
“Social Content and Psychological Content” (1988), that it has 
unpalatable consequences, and that, in any case, Brian’s conclusion 
about the role of that-clauses in capturing psychological content is too 
hasty. Then I will argue that the perception-based theory of conceptual 
content that Brian advocates in his paper “Phenomenal Intentionality as 
the Basis of Mental Content” (2003b) cannot account for conceptual 
content, and that an internalist must embrace a broader conception of 
phenomenology that includes a sui generis kind of phenomenology 
proprietary to conceptual thought.4 
Though this paper is critical, I want to emphasize how much I admire 
Brian’s work, and how much I have learned from studying it. Brian was 
a deep and subtle thinker. 
1. Social Content and Psychological Content  
In “Social Content and Psychological Content”, Brian argues that the 
following principle is false: 
  
(A) Sameness of de dicto or oblique occurrence of a general term in two 
belief ascriptions implies, if everything else is the same, sameness 
of the psychological content of the two beliefs thus ascribed. 
(Loar 1988, 2017, 153) 
and he concludes from this that there are two different kinds of contents 
that beliefs have, social content, which is determined by the socially 
determined meanings of the terms in the ascriptions, and psychological 
content, which is determined by the way an individual subjectively 
conceives things as being (which involves the psychological, including 
inferential, role the state has for the individual). Psychological content 
is, according to Brian, entirely subjective (and grounded in 
phenomenology), and is not determined by sociolinguistic facts external 
to the thinker. Social content, which is what is captured by that-clauses, 
on the other hand, is sociolinguistically determined. Though only the 
former kind of content, which captures how things are from the thinker’s 
point of view, is relevant to psychological explanation, Brian maintains 
that beliefs (and their constituent concepts) also have socially 
determined contents. 
Brian’s rejection of (A) is based on cases in which univocal 
ascriptions fail to capture personal psychological differences. Some of 
these cases involve translation and proper names, which I would reject 
for tendentious reasons that I will not defend here. (I do so in The 
Quality of Thought.) So I will focus on the cases involving general 
terms. 
There is an initial question about how (A) is to be interpreted. There 
is a reading of it on which it means that for an individual to apply the 
same belief ascription to different individuals is for him to attribute the 
same belief to them. Use of the same of that-clause implies that the 
ascriber means to be attributing the same belief. In the ordinary case, 
this is true—perhaps even trivially so. Without some special reason to 
the contrary, we assume that the same words mean the same thing when 
one uses them on different occasions. If I say that two individuals 
believe that cats are furry, I am ascribing the same belief to them. 
Brian’s intended interpretation, I take it, is, rather, that if two 
ascriptions using the same that-clause are true, it follows that the 
ascribees believe the same thing. And this is what he claims is not the 
case. The focus, then, is on the truth of the ascriptions. 
Brian is here (and throughout his work on the philosophy of content) 
relying heavily on the Burgean idea that there are cases in which it is 
appropriate to use an ascription that does not capture subjective content, 
but in which we should nonetheless take the ascriptions to be literally 
true. He imagines a case in which an individual, Paul, associates two 
  
different concepts with the word “cat”, wrongly thinking that there are 
two different kinds of animals that go by the same general name (1988, 
2017, 157–158). No one knows this, however; so when Paul says, for 
example, “I like cats”, he is interpreted by his audience as meaning by 
“cat” what they mean by “cat”—i.e., what “cat” means in the language 
they speak. And when they attribute this belief to him, on the basis of 
what he has said, they use the word “cat” as they understand it (with its 
socially determined meaning).5 But while the ascription may be 
appropriately made and true, its that-clause content need not match the 
particular conception of cats that Paul had in mind when he said that  he 
likes cats. In a case where it does not, Paul’s belief has a social content 
(the content of the that-clause used to report what he believes) and a 
different psychological content (Paul’s personal conception). 
I think there are two serious problems for Brian’s argument, and, 
hence, for the two-factor view of intentionality he constructs as a 
compromise between his internalism and the falsehood of (A). The first 
is that the Burgean principle it relies on—that ascriptions it is 
appropriate (intuitively natural) to make are, all things equal, literally 
true—does not apply in any of the cases that are supposed to show that 
content (for Brian, a kind of content) is determined by factors extrinsic 
to an individual. The second is that in allowing that a psychological 
state can have two different kinds of content, Brian condones a practice 
that allows that we may all be massively incoherent, or at least 
duplicitous, in what we believe—that our beliefs have inconsistent 
socially and psychologically determined contents. In the next two 
sections I develop these complaints, beginning with the second. 
Before doing that, however, I want briefly to take issue with Brian’s 
claim that that-clauses cannot capture subjective psychological content. 
He maintains that it is “impossible” . . . “to explain that-clause 
ascriptions in internalist terms”, (1987, 2017, 178; my emphasis), and 
that “we lack forms of words conventionally designed for reporting 
personal conceivings” (id. 179). 
This seems very implausible. If the contents of attitudes are 
propositions, and that-clauses express (or denote) propositions, then 
how could there be no that-clause that captures psychological content? 
How could an individual have a conception of things without employing 
concepts? And how could a conception not be constituted by what an 
individual thinks—i.e., which propositions he entertains? 
In taking up a first-person perspective on intentionality, I think Brian 
should have been more careful in distinguishing the various functions 
propositional attitude ascriptions have, and avoided their role in 
third-person explanation and prediction of behavior. That-clauses can 
capture subjective intentional content, even if that is not their only, or 
  
even primary, function in our ascription of propositional attitudes to 
each other. The practical purposes typically served by such ascriptions 
do not require that we specify precisely what someone is thinking. Often 
enough, information about what an ascribee is referring to, what 
properties are being attributed to it, and what the ascribee intends to do 
with it or to it, are sufficient. This is the basic information we need in 
order to anticipate others’ behavior, especially as it might affect 
ourselves, and to communicate our findings to relevant parties. Details 
about how an individual is conceiving of objects and properties may not 
matter if we are just trying to get a bead on what he is likely to do, to 
what, or to whom. Inexact attributions can count as true for practical 
purposes, even if they are not literally true. 
But it does not follow from this that a that-clause cannot capture what 
someone is thinking, the way he is thinking it. For an individual, from 
the subjective perspective, there is no thinking of a thing and attributing 
a property to it that does not involve some specific ways of thinking of 
the thing and the property. Unless one supposes that individuals never 
accurately grasp the socially-determined meanings of terms in the 
language they speak, and which they use to express their thoughts, then 
it ought to be possible for a that-clause ascription—especially a 
self-ascription—to express (or denote) the very same proposition that an 
individual grasps from the subjective point of view. (Indeed, this seems 
presupposed by the case presented above in which Paul associates two 
concepts with “cat”.) Brian does discuss situations in which our primary 
concern is precisely describing individuals’ mental states as they have 
them; but he says that in such cases we project from our own case, and 
what we are projecting cannot be captured by that-clauses. I do not think 
he has provided sufficient support for this claim. 
1.1. Epidemic Duplicity  
Suppose that one of the concepts Paul associates with “cat” is the 
standard one—say, feline mammal—while the other is very 
idiosyncratic—say, feline amphibian. He thinks that some cat-like 
creatures are in fact cat-mimicking giant salamanders (Andrias catus) 
(he once watched Planet Earth while tripping). Though he thinks these 
are native to East Asia, he suspects that some have been smuggled into 
the US and sold as pets. In fact, he thinks his neighbor has one. (It 
spends a lot of time near her bird bath, which Paul finds suspicious.) He 
knows the difference between mammals and amphibians, and that the 
classes Mammalia and Amphibia are, logically, mutually exclusive 
(nothing can be both a mammal and an amphibian). 
One day, Paul’s aunt Lydia overhears him muttering “There’s that cat 
again; stalking crickets, no doubt!” and attributes to him the belief that a 
  
cat is stalking crickets in the neighbors’ yard. If we accept this 
attribution as literally true (by Lydia’s lights), we are committed to 
Paul’s believing that there is a feline mammal in the neighbors’ yard. 
From a subjective perspective, however, what Paul believes is that there 
is a feline amphibian in the neighbors’ yard. Moreover, for Brian, it is 
one and the same mental state that has these two contents , the first 
socially determined and the second personally determined. So we end up 
having to say that Paul has a belief with two distinct, contradictory 
contents. Given the likelihood that the concepts individuals associate 
with terms in the language they speak are quite often out of sync with 
those terms’ socially determined contents, we seem committed to a 
practice that to a large extent makes a mess of our fellows’ mental lives. 
(Nor need the double contents we count an individual as having be 
contradictory. The very idea that a given belief typically has two distinct 
contents is suspect enough.) 
With respect to his (less fanciful) Paul case, Brian argues that we 
should say that Paul’s beliefs “are not inconsistent in their psychological 
contents” (1988, 2017, 158)—because they are, for Paul, inferentially 
isolated. Paul might have distinct beliefs univocally attributable to him 
by “Paul believes that cats have tails” and “Paul believes that cats do not 
have tails” (where “cat” has its social meaning in both), but his 
rationality is not impugned if these beliefs have different psychological 
roles for him. But what I am concerned with here is cases in which we 
accept a third-person attribution to a single occurrent belief state that 
has a different psychological (in Brian’s sense) content. It seems that 
Brian is committed to saying that a belief can have two distinct, even 
contradictory, contents. From Aunt Lydia’s (social) point of view, Paul 
believes there is a feline mammal in the yard. And her attribution of this 
belief to Paul is true. From Paul’s (subjective) point of view, Paul 
believes that there is a feline amphibian in the yard. And his 
self-attribution of this belief (were he to make it) is true. This is not a 
case in which two distinct beliefs having prima facie contradictory 
content are assigned on the basis of distinct utterances, but of assigning 
a single, occurrent belief different (incompatible) contents. There is 
nothing for Paul to compartmentalize. The issue concerns what we ought 
to say Paul believes at the moment Aunt Lydia says that Paul believes 
there is a cat in the neighbors’ yard. It is not at all plausible that Paul’s 
belief has, simultaneously, the content there is a feline mammal in the 
yard and the content there is an amphibian in the yard. And we should 
be suspicious of a theory that implies that this is possible.  
1.2. The Burgean Intuitions6  
  
Tyler Burge (1979, 1982, 1986) presents cases that are meant to 
elicit intuitions that, in combination with a plausible general principle 
about belief ascription, provide a strong reason to reject any 
individualist conception of mind. The intuitions (the “Intuitions”) 
concern what it is natural to say about what the individuals described in 
the thought experiments believe, and the general principle (the 
“Principle”) is that, all things being equal, belief ascriptions it is natural 
to make are literally true. The Intuitions are supposed to override any 
sense that the ceteris paribus clause of the Principle is sprung because 
of the conceptual idiosyncracies of Burge’s imagined subjects: they 
believe what they say in spite of their deviance from the communal 
norms governing the usage of their words. 
The Intuitions about what it is natural to say are powerful. Burge is 
surely right that in the situations he describes it is natural to attribute 
beliefs to his subjects using the very words they utter, even though their 
understanding of those words is at odds with their socially determined 
meanings. Nonetheless, I think the Intuitions are not sufficient to 
establish Burge’s thesis. What it is natural to say in a given case need 
not be literally true; and there may be compelling reasons for thinking 
that it is not. I will argue that in any case of the kind required by a 
Burgean thought experiment there is a reason for not taking the 
homophonic ascriptions at face value, which is not neutralized by the 
intuitive naturalness of making them. 
In the arthritis example, we have an individual (I will call her Anna) 
who, according to Burge, believes that she has arthritis in her thigh, in 
spite of the fact that her understanding of the term “arthritis” deviates 
from its meaning in the language she speaks (“arthritis” “as used in [her] 
linguistic community, does not apply to ailments outside joints. Indeed, 
it fails to do so by a standard, non-technical dictionary definition” 
(Burge 1979, 78)). Though she does not have a proper grasp of the 
concept arthritis, Anna nonetheless has this concept, and it partly 
constitutes the content of her belief. Counterfactual Anna, who has the 
same physical history as Anna up until the moment she expresses her 
worry about her thigh, is a member of a different linguistic community, 
in which “arthritis” applies by definition to rheumatoid diseases that can 
occur in muscle as well as joints. In this counterfactual context, none of 
Anna’s “arthritis” utterances mean what they do in her actual context, 
and none of her beliefs have their actual content. Since by hypothesis 
the only difference between the actual and counterfactual situations is 
the practices of the linguistic communities Anna is a member of, we 
seem compelled to conclude that it is these factors, and not something 
internal to Anna, that determine the contents of her “arthritis” beliefs. 
It is essential to Burge’s argument that it be literally true in the actual 
context that, in spite of her confusion, Anna believes that she has 
  
arthritis in her thigh. If she does not believe this in the actual case, then 
the counterfactual case is irrelevant, and no conclusions about social 
content determination are established by the thought experiment. (In the 
counterfactual case, there is no discrepancy between what “arthritis” 
means and what Anna thinks it means.) It is only on the assumption that 
Anna believes she has arthritis in her thigh that the content-determining 
role of sociolinguistic context is made salient by a comparison with the 
counterfactual case. 
One might be tempted to think that Anna’s statement to her doctor is 
evidence that she does not have the concept arthritis, and, hence, that 
she cannot have the belief that she has arthritis in her thigh. After all, 
counterfactual Anna does not have the concept arthritis because 
“arthritis” in the counterfactual community applies by definition to a 
disease that can occur in muscle (or otherwise outside of joints). So why 
should actual Anna’s belief that “arthritis” applies to (we may suppose) 
those very muscle ailments not preclude her from having the concept in 
the actual case? The reason is, Burge argues, that Anna is not, to our 
knowledge, an abnormal speaker of English, or obviously deceitful, 
dissembling or deranged; and there is nothing odd about any of her 
previous “arthritis” utterances. So we should take her utterances at face 
value: what she says is what she believes; and we should take our own 
ascriptions at face value as well: what she believes is what we say she 
believes. There is, as Burge says, “a methodological bias in favor of 
taking natural discourse literally, other things being equal.  . . . Literal 
interpretation is ceteris paribus preferred” (Burge 1979, 88). And we 
should continue to do this even after we become aware of Anna’s 
misconception, because there is a very strong intuition that the natural 
and correct way to describe her mistake is to say that she (falsely) 
believes that she has arthritis in her thigh. 
These considerations show that comparison with the counterfactual 
case is not the crux of Burge’s argument. The reasons for thinking that it 
is literally true that Anna believes that she has arthritis in her thigh, 
despite her confusion, are themselves reasons for thinking that 
psychological content can be (and typically is) socially determined. 
Given that literal interpretation is preferred even in cases of partial 
understanding, or misunderstanding like Anna’s, and that literal 
meaning is determined socially, it follows that the contents of Anna ’s 
thoughts are determined socially. The counterfactual case is meant to 
reinforce this conclusion by showing that thought content can change 
with change of linguistic context, without any difference in intrinsic 
properties of thinkers. But the contrast depends upon having established 
that actual Anna’s thought contents are sociolinguistically determined. 
The heart of the argument is the explanation of how this works.  
  
A different kind of example is developed in “Intellectual Norms and 
Foundations of Mind” (Burge 1986). Here we have a subject (I will 
call him “Andy”) who is the victim of neither partial understanding nor 
misunderstanding with respect to the specimen term (“sofa”). Andy 
knows the meaning of the word “sofa” in his language. He knows that 
sofas are by definition pieces of furniture, and he is fully competent in 
the use of the word. Nonetheless (according to Burge), he doubts that 
sofas are furniture. Andy has become convinced that they are not 
furniture, but some sort of artworks or religious artifacts. He expresses 
his suspicion by saying “Sofas are not pieces of furniture!” He is wrong, 
however. His belief that sofas are not furniture was formed on the basis 
of systematically misleading evidence. 
In a counterfactual case, in contrast, we are to suppose that a 
physically identical Andy says something true when he utters the 
sentence “sofas are not pieces of furniture”. In the counterfactual 
language community, the word “sofa” is applied by definition not to 
pieces of furniture, but to works of art or religious artifacts, just as Andy 
suspects. When counterfactual Andy says “Sofas are not pieces of 
furniture!” his utterance, and the belief it expresses, are both true. They 
do not, however, have the same content as Andy’s actual utterances. He 
counterfactually neither says nor believes that sofas are not pieces of 
furniture, because “sofa” in the counterfactual community does not 
mean sofa. 
The pattern of reasoning in the Andy case is the same as in Anna’s: 
the difference between the contents of actual and counterfactual beliefs 
is due to the actual and counterfactual meanings of the words uttered, 
which are determined by factors extrinsic to the speaker. Moreover, the 
points made above with respect to the role of the intuition about what 
Anna believes in the actual case, and the comparison to the 
counterfactual case, apply to Andy’s case as well. The comparison of 
actual Andy and counterfactual Andy is not what establishes the 
anti-individualist conclusion; it merely dramatizes it.  
Further, in Andy’s case it is not misunderstanding that is overridden 
by communal meaning, and which provides the essential contrast to the 
ordinary case. Andy understands perfectly well what his community 
takes “sofa” to mean. It is, rather, as Burge says, “nonstandard theory” 
(1986, 709). Nonetheless, there is an important parallel to Anna’s case. 
Both Anna’s and Andy’s utterances are prima facie conceptually 
problematic: neither involves a merely empirical divergence from 
communal standards and belief. Anna’s utterance indicates conceptual 
confusion, and Andy’s indicates an attempt at conceptual subversion. I 
will characterize what the cases have in common as conceptual 
dissonance. In all of Burge’s examples it is the fact that the individuals 
in question think what they say, in spite of the conceptual dissonance of 
  
their utterances, that provides the reason for thinking that the Principle 
has general application, and that communal linguistic meaning 
determines mental content. 
The inclusion of the ceteris paribus clause in the Principle indicates that 
Burge thinks there are conditions under which literal interpretation is 
not preferred. This might mean that the individuals’ words are 
themselves to be reinterpreted. If there can be cases of mismatch 
between thought content and linguistic content, then, it remains to be 
seen what sorts of criteria there are for identifying them. Burge (1978, 
134, 1979, 90–91) mentions utterances involving slips of the tongue, 
spoonerisms, malaprops, and radical misunderstandings as appropriate 
candidates for reinterpretation. In a parenthetical remark (1979, 91), 
however, Burge indicates that he thinks utterances involving malaprops 
or radical misunderstandings are not exempt from the Principle. He says 
that he is “not convinced” that someone who believes that “orangutan” 
is a word for a fruit drink and says, “An orangutan is a fruit drink” 
should not therefore be taken to mean that an orangutan is a fruit drink 
and believe that an orangutan is a fruit drink. 
But it seems that Burge could reject such radical cases and still have 
an important thesis about the determination of mental content. (He has 
in fact, in conversation, disavowed the intuition about the orangutan 
case.) He says (id., 92): “The thought experiment depends only on there 
being some cases in which a person’s incomplete understanding does not 
force reinterpretation of his expressions in describing his mental 
contents. Such cases appear to be legion”. I take it that Burge means that 
his argument does not require commitment to the Principle for every 
utterance. Standard practice can call for reinterpretation in cases of 
linguistic incompetence or momentary lapses without derailing the 
anti-individualist argument. What the argument requires is cases in 
which the Principle overrides conceptual dissonance of one kind or 
another. Conceptual dissonance is a prima facie reason for thinking that 
all things are not equal. This is why Burge stresses that the deviance 
from community norms is not merely empirical. Mere empirical 
deviance would not raise the issue of non-literal interpretation, and 
would therefore not provide the resistance needed to reveal the 
determinative role of the Principle. Since homophonic interpretation is 
still preferable in these cases, they do show something interesting and 
important about psychological content. 
But why should we think that homophonic interpretation is preferable 
in these cases? Why is the Principle’s ceteris paribus clause not sprung 
by the conceptual oddity of the utterances? The answer constitutes, I 
think, the very heart of Burge’s argument. We do not reinterpret in these 
cases because of the Intuition about the correct way to describe them is 
  
so powerful. Burge (id., fn. 4) says “I used to believe that a fortnight is a 
period of ten days”. He knows that what he used to believe cannot be 
true; he knows he made a conceptual error. But he describes what he 
used to think using the very word he did not understand. This is, Burge 
stresses, the natural and intuitively correct thing to say. But it shows that 
communal meaning trumps individual misconception in determining the 
contents of a generally competent speaker’s thoughts. 
The role of the Burgean Intuitions should now be clear. The Principle 
applies in these cases in spite of prima facie evidence that all things are 
not equal because of the clear and firm Intuition about the naturalness of 
our homophonic ascriptions. 
The Intuition is undeniable. Nevertheless, I think it is misleading. It 
cannot be uncritically accepted as evidence that all things are equal in 
the situations Burge describes. I think there are features of our ordinary 
belief-ascribing practices that militate against Burge’s anti-individualist 
conclusion. These practices are governed by a principle of charity 
enjoining ascription of contradictory or incoherent beliefs except, 
perhaps, in extraordinary circumstances, and also by the principle that 
utterances betraying linguistic incompetence should not be interpreted 
literally. 
It has been objected to Burge (beginning with Fodor 1982) that all 
things are not equal in Anna’s case because the sentence “she has 
arthritis in her thigh” is, by hypothesis, self-contradictory or 
conceptually incoherent, and there is a competing principle governing 
ordinary discourse that says that one’s attributions ought to be 
charitable. The question whether or not Anna has such a belief should be 
distinguished from the question whether or not we attribute one to her in 
using a homophonic ascription. If Anna utters the sentence “my arthritis 
has spread to my thigh”, it might be open to question what she actually 
meant (what she actually thought). But if we utter the sentence “Anna 
believes that she has arthritis in her thigh”, then there is no question that 
the embedded sentence “she has arthritis in her thigh” is for us 
conceptually incoherent. For, again as Burge stresses, Anna’s error is 
not an ordinary empirical one; it is a conceptual matter that arthritis 
cannot occur outside of joints. But given that the kinds of errors that 
Burge describes are common, to suppose that individuals’ words should 
be taken at face value in such cases is to turn a practice of intending to 
make sense of their behavior (attitude attribution) into a practice that 
routinely makes nonsense of their mental lives. If this is not our 
practice, then the kinds of cases Burge describes in “Individualism and 
the Mental” are ones in which literal interpretation is not preferable, and 
the conclusion he wants about the contents of thought does not follow 
from the naturalness of our attributions. The fact that we find it natural 
to make them in spite of their incoherence no doubt requires an 
  
explanation. But if the principle of charity is upheld, it cannot be 
maintained that we ought to take them to be literally true.7 It can also be 
argued that the principle of charity prevents attribution of the belief that 
sofas are not furniture to Andy since, by the ascriber’s lights, that belief 
is conceptually incoherent. 
Nonetheless, as strong as the charity objection is, I think it does not 
really get to the bottom of Burge’s argument for anti-individualism. 
Given the role the examples are supposed to play in the thought 
experiments, it really is not necessary that they involve the sort of prima 
facie conceptual incoherence Burge’s actual examples exhibit. The 
examples are supposed to illustrate the domineering role of the Principle 
by presenting it with a serious obstacle to overcome. They are supposed 
to show that even when an individual’s errors raise the specter of 
reinterpretation, homophonic attribution is completely natural and 
compelling, and therefore the Principle still applies. I have argued that 
the Anna and Andy cases run afoul of the principle of charity. But 
perhaps Burge can accept (because he can explain away) cases in which 
reinterpretation is forced, because there remain so many cases in which 
it is not. Giving up the original examples need not spoil the argument 
for anti-individualism, if there are others that can play the same role. 
Here is one. 
Consider Marge. Marge fancies herself a sophisticate, and often 
opines upon the finer things in life. On one occasion, she declares “You 
can tell the quality of a diamond by how many faucets it has”. (It is not 
a slip. When pressed (“Faucets?”), Marge does not retract her 
statement.) If we say that Marge said that the quality of a diamond 
depends on how many faucets it has, it seems clear that what we are 
saying is literally true. That is what she said—what the words she used 
mean in her language. Moreover, it seems entirely natural to say that 
Marge believes that the quality of a diamond depends on how many 
faucets it has. Marge is, of course, confused. But we describe her 
confusion using the very word she misuses, just as we do in the case of 
Anna. And after she has been corrected Marge might describe her 
misstatement using the words she uttered (just as Burge did in the 
“fortnight” case). 
Marge’s utterance is sufficiently dissonant to raise suspicions about 
her competence with the term “faucet”, and, hence, to present a prima 
facie obstacle to literal interpretation. But it does not run afoul of the 
principle of charity. It is certainly odd to say that diamonds have 
faucets; but it is not conceptually or logically impossible that it be true. 
(If you look closely and carefully enough, as at Albritton’s pencil, you 
can see the tiny things.) So perhaps this is just the kind of example that 
Burge needs. It does not involve a contradiction, but neither is it an 
ordinary empirical error. It is a rather extraordinary one: faucets are bits 
  
of plumbing. It is bizarre to think that diamonds have plumbing. Anyone 
who seriously says so thereby provides prima facie evidence of not 
knowing what a faucet is—of not being competent with the concept 
faucet. However, since the Intuition applies in Marge’s case, the 
Principle ought to apply as well, and Marge ought to have the (our) 
concept faucet, and think that diamonds have them, in spite of her 
confusion. 
But there are strong counterintuitions in cases of this kind. If we 
reflect, and ask ourselves if Marge really was thinking that diamonds 
have faucets, I think the answer has to be “No”. This really is not what 
she thought. She simply misexpressed herself. She had a false belief 
about which word to use to say what she was thinking, and that belief 
led to her anomalous utterance. (Cf. Bach 1988; Crane 1991.) In 
spite of the fact that the Intuition holds, the ceteris paribus clause of the 
Principle is sprung: all things are not equal in Marge’s case, because she 
is not fully competent with the words she uses. 
Since Burge accepts that malaprops are evidence of a lack of the 
minimal competence required for an individual to be subject to the 
Principle (1979, 90), he ought to agree that it is not literally true that 
Marge believes that diamonds have faucets. The crucial point here, 
however, is that it is nonetheless intuitively completely natural to say 
that this is what she believes. But it is clear that we do not think that our 
homophonic ascription to Marge is literally true. We know that she 
meant to say “facets”, and that this is what she was actually thinking. So 
the presence of the Intuition provides no assurance that we should apply 
the Principle in spite of a speaker’s errors. But Burge’s argument for 
anti-individualism depends on this: naturalness of homophonic 
ascription is supposed to overpower any inclination to reinterpret. Cases 
of this type show that the Intuitions concern only what it is natural to 
say, since, on reflection, we do not take our ascriptions to be literally 
true. The Intuitions do not prevent the ceteris paribus clause of the 
Principle from being sprung. 
Insofar, then, as Brian’s case for a socially determined kind of belief 
content relies on Burgean Intuitions, his two-factor theory of content is 
unmotivated. An internalist need not (and should not) recognize two 
kinds of intentional content. 
2. Phenomenal Intentionality  
In “Phenomenal Intentionality as the Basis of Mental Content”, Brian 
says that 
Internal intentionality is to be located primitively in perceptually 
based concepts. It will be derivatively located in nonperceptual 
  
concepts via their conceptual connections with perceptual concepts. 
The subjective intentional properties of nonperceptual concepts are 
always a matter of, as it were, looking sideways via their 
connections with perceptual concepts. 
       (Loar 2003b, 2017, 310; page number references in this 
      section are to this work.) 
 
These foundational, perceptually based concepts include singular 
perceptual demonstratives, which pick out individuals, perceptual 
recognitional concepts, which are “demonstrative concepts that purport 
to pick out, perceptually, kinds and properties” (ibid.), “certain general 
concepts of approximate spatial relations, shapes, and the like, and a 
certain conception of a three-dimensional object as it persists over time” 
(313). The intentional content of these concepts, their “directedness” 
toward particular objects, properties and relations (whether or not they 
refer), is derived from the directedness of perceptual experience—the 
experience as of objects, properties, and relations, which is itself 
determined by perceptual phenomenology. The intentional content of 
perceptual experience is an intrinsic feature of its phenomenology, and 
is determined entirely independently of relations to external objects and 
properties. Perceptual concepts inherit their intentional contents from 
perceptions, and nonperceptual (“systematic” or “theoretical”) concepts 
acquire theirs in virtue of their inferential relations with them—their 
conceptual roles. All internal mental intentionality, therefore, is derived 
from the intentionality of perception. 
I have two problems with Brian’s view. The first is with the notion of 
a perceptual concept. I do not think this is workable. Perceptual 
concepts, as Brian understands them, incorporate perceptions: 
The feature [the directedness of visual demonstrative concepts] 
presumably belongs primarily to a visual perception, and 
derivatively to a visual demonstrative concept that incorporates the 
perception. 
(302)8 
I do not think it is possible for concepts to incorporate percepts. 
Concepts and percepts are fundamentally distinct and incompatible 
kinds of mental entities, and cannot be combined in such a way that 
their amalgamation constitutes a concept. We can have concepts of 
(referring to) perceptual experiences; but the internal intentional 
contents of these concepts are not individuated with respect to the 
percepts they are of, by incorporation or otherwise.9 
  
I also want to take issue with Brian’s account of a particular kind of 
perceptual concept, recognitional concepts. I do not think these kinds of 
concepts exist either, and not just because concepts cannot contain 
perceptions. There are no, in my view, and cannot be, concepts of the 
kind that Brian places at the foundation of mental intentionality.  
My second problem with Brian’s view is that it is too conservative 
about what kinds of phenomenology there are. In recognizing only 
familiar sensory kinds of phenomenology, Brian limits the possibilities 
of his internalism, and its effectiveness in giving a general account of 
conceptual content. An experiential theory of conceptual content that 
restricts phenomenality to sensory experience inherits the notorious 
difficulties of the Empiricist program in coping with non-perceptual 
concepts.10 It does not have the resources to explain non-sensory 
intentionality. I do not think the inclusion of conceptual roles can 
remedy the situation, unless non-sensory phenomenology is somehow 
thereby smuggled in. 
I develop these objections in the next two sections. 
2.1. Perceptual Concepts  
It is traditional to make a sharp distinction between concepts and 
percepts, thought and perception, sapience and sentience. I think there 
are powerful intuitions supporting this distinction, and that these two 
kinds of mentality must always be kept strictly separated in theorizing 
about the mind. Though there may be total conscious occurrent states 
containing concepts and percepts, percepts cannot be parts of concepts, 
and concepts cannot be parts of percepts. The tendency to blur the 
distinction comes, it seems to me, from a commitment (tacit or explicit) 
to the idea that the content of a concept must determine what, in general 
or in particular, it purports to refer to. This is especially so in the case of 
indexicals and demonstratives. 
Intuitively, my thoughts this is an unpleasant sensation directed at 
two different sensory experiences on two separate occasions, are 
different thoughts. They are about different sensations, differ in their 
truth conditions, and may differ in truth value; so, the standard argument 
goes, they must have different contents. And it seems the only way to 
explain this is to assign different contents to the two tokens of this. One 
way to do this is to incorporate sensations into the token demonstrative 
concepts. It is also often remarked that in order to understand an 
experiential concept, one must have had the relevant experience. For 
example, a congenitally blind person could not have the concept red. To 
understand red, to cognitively grasp the concept red, one must 
experience red. This suggests that the experience is somehow intimately 
involved with the concept—perhaps as a constituent of it. 
  
Another source of this tendency, it seems to me, is a bias toward 
approaching the study of mentality from the third-person 
perspective—particularly from the point of view of our practices of 
attribution and communication. If you want to tell someone what I said 
when I said, “This is an unpleasant sensation”—if you want them to 
understand what I said—you cannot just leave it at repeating my words. 
Many have the intuition that if the third party has no idea what sort of 
sensation I was referring to, she will not really (or not completely) 
understand what I said. The attributor/communicator must supplement 
the content of the demonstrative “this sensation” in such a way as to 
direct the hearer’s attention on the relevant kind of sensation.11 But 
these practical requirements of third-person attribution and 
communication can be met without shoehorning identifying content into 
demonstrative concepts. The relevant information can be communicated 
separately. 
Moreover, one need not accept that grasping concepts of phenomenal 
properties requires experiencing them. I once knew someone who was 
born without a sense of smell. After many conversations with her, I 
realized that her grasp of the concept of olfactory experience was no 
different from mine. We would say the same thing if we were asked to 
explain what it is: it is a kind of sensory experience, as different from 
others as they are from each other, involving the nose, often confused 
with taste (she did not fail to notice that other people enjoyed food a lot 
more than she did), etc., etc. In contrast, knowing what smelling is like 
in general (knowing what it is like to have olfactory experience), or 
what, in particular, lavender smells like—does require experience. 
However, I maintain that this kind of knowledge is not conceptual at 
all.12 
But why (people keep asking me) can we not just say that perceptual 
(phenomenal) concepts are “hybrids”, like (on some views) emotions, 
consisting of sensory and cognitive components? As I said above, 
nothing prevents the occurrence of complex occurrent states of 
consciousness comprising sensory and cognitive components; but I 
insist that there cannot be cognitive components that themselves 
incorporate perceptual ones, nor perceptual components that incorporate 
cognitive ones. This is not a quibble about how to use the word 
“concept”. It is an insistence that we recognize the fundamental 
differences among different kinds of mental states, and the impossibility 
of their combining in such a way as to produce a state that is of one 
kind, but not the other. 
It is clear that there cannot be cross-modal sensory incorporations. 
One’s total conscious state may include simultaneous auditory and 
olfactory experiences; but there can be no sounds parts of which are 
  
smells, or smells parts of which are sounds. This is simply impossible. 
Phenomenologies do not mix in this way.13 
I think this is true of cross-categorical (sensory/cognitive) 
incorporations as well. 
My tendentious reason for believing this, which I will defend shortly, 
is that occurrent concepts (and thoughts) are themselves experiences, of 
a unique sui generis, cognitive kind, and that, therefore, the Principle of 
Phenomenal Immiscibility applies to them, with respect to any other 
kind of experience. Sounds cannot have smells in them, and neither can 
concepts—for the same reason. 
But there are also good non-tendentious, intuitive reasons for resisting 
cross-categorical incorporation even if one denies that there is 
conceptual phenomenology. The traditional distinction between the two 
kinds of mind—sentient and sapient—is, I think, based on our own 
experience. It seems clear, from the subjective point of view, that 
thinking is different from sensing. We recognize that they are different 
kinds of mental activity, and that we can engage in one without 
engaging in the other. Further, we find it conceivable that there are 
creatures who can sense but cannot think, and creatures who can think 
but cannot sense. But if one can sense without thinking, and vice versa, 
it must be that percepts and concepts are, metaphysically, different kinds 
of things. 
Another strong intuitive reason for resisting conceptual-sensory 
assimilation is this. Concepts (conceptual contents) must be thinkable; 
but percepts (and images) are not. It is nonsense, a category mistake, to 
say that what you were thinking (or part of what you were thinking) was, 
e.g., the taste of cinnamon, or the sound of a piano. It is true that you 
can think about these experiences, but only in the sense that you can 
have otherwise-content-individuated concepts that refer to them. 
Concepts must be capable of being thought, in the course of thinking a 
complete thought of which they are constituents. But sensory 
experiences cannot be thought. One can no more think the taste of 
cinnamon than one can hear it. (Nor, for that matter, can one think 
physical objects and properties—trendy Continentalisms like “How do 
you think Derrida?” notwithstanding. This is a reason for rejecting 
certain widespread accounts of the contents of singular thoughts.) If 
these intuitions are sound, then there can be no perceptual concepts, as 
Brian understands them. 
I also think there are no recognitional concepts, as Brian understands 
them, though for different reasons. Recognition, in my view, essentially 
involves a particular kind of nonconceptual experience—a feeling of 
familiarity. The application of a demonstrative concept ( that feeling) to 
a familiar experience is not what makes it familiar; nor is a 
demonstrative concept individuated by the experience it is applied to. A 
  
person with perfect pitch does not have a different concept of middle C 
from me. The fact that she instantly identifies the pitch when she hears it 
does not make her concept different from mine. What is different 
between us is her infallibly correct application of it on the basis of her 
experience of it. Her experience of middle  C is like my experience of 
red: I recognize red on sight; she recognizes middle C on hearing. But I 
do not think I have a different concept of red from someone who is color 
blind, or totally blind. 
Now, it might be wondered why it should matter to Brian if there are 
no perceptual concepts (as he understands them). Perhaps conceptual 
incorporation of percepts is not a necessary feature of his view: 
perceptual experience could be a foundation for conceptual 
intentionality without incorporation. I agree that incorporation is not 
necessary (for me, because impossible) for a phenomenal theory of 
intentionality. But I think it is essential to Brian’s account, on which the 
intentionality of all concepts is derived from the intentionality of 
perceptual experience. 
For Brian, content cannot arise from inferential relations among 
concepts, since, for him, thinking is “something lively—there is 
something it is like to engage in it”, whereas conceptual roles on their 
own are “too blank to constitute internal mental content as we perceive 
it”—because they are “purely dispositional” (296). There is a 
phenomenology of thinking; but there is no phenomenology of 
dispositional states. Conceptual roles are “central in individuating 
thought contents” (ibid.), but they cannot be sources of contents, since 
they are not phenomenal. 
Furthermore, a view on which non-intentional conceptual roles are 
“phenomenalized” by inclusion of pure, non-intentional perceptual 
states—which are, in their turn, thereby “conceptualized” (i.e., 
intentionalized)—is, according to Brian, not available. Sensory 
phenomenology is inseparable from its intentionality (“We can hardly 
peel the phenomenal aspects of [e.g.] vision away from its 
intentionality” (297)). The phenomenalization of conceptual roles 
would, necessarily, simultaneously be their intentionalization. And since 
(as it seems Brian assumes) there is only sensory phenomenology, 
sensory (perceptual) states are the only source of intentionality.  
Finally, given that phenomenal properties are intrinsic, phenomenal 
concepts cannot get their content from extrinsic relations to sensory 
states, including reference. Brian thinks psychological contents are not 
individuated by external referential relations. But if he thinks this 
because he thinks that content is phenomenal, and phenomenology is 
intrinsic, then he ought to accept it for internal reference as well. 
Phenomenal concepts (including recognitional concepts) are not 
individuated by phenomenal states in virtue of referring to them. They 
  
must incorporate them. This is, on Brian’s theory, the only way to 
conceptualize sensory phenomenal intentionality. The content of a 
concept is internally determined. This does not just mean that it is 
determined by features internal to thinkers: it is determined by features 
internal to concepts themselves. 
To close this section, I want to identify what seems to me a significant 
tension between Brian’s claims that conceptual roles are “too blank to 
constitute internal mental content”, and that they are “central in 
individuating thought contents” (296). I think what Brian has in mind is 
that position in a conceptual network is not in itself sufficient to confer 
content: the interconnected concepts must have independently derived 
content. It cannot be that every concept derives its contents from its 
inferential connections to other concepts. There must be a foundation of 
intrinsically contentful concepts. 
However, it is not clear that relatedness to other concepts can 
constitute the content of a concept if phenomenology is both intrinsic 
and conceptually foundational. In general, the phenomenal character of 
a state will not be altered by causal connections (dispositional or 
manifest) with other states. Nor, therefore, will its content. (Phenomenal 
context effects are not to the point here.) At best, then, it seems that 
tracing connections to other concepts will enable individuation only in 
an epistemic sense: the intrinsic content of a concept can be revealed, if 
it is not immediately available to introspection, in its inferential 
connections to other concepts. 
2.2. Conceptual Phenomenology  
My tendentious explanation for the intuitive facts appealed to above 
about what is thinkable and not, is that thinking is a distinctive kind of 
experience, and that different kinds of experience are individuated by 
their different kinds of phenomenology. Thinking is not the same kind 
of experience as seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and so on. So 
thinking must have its very own brand of phenomenology—a 
phenomenology which I have elsewhere (Pitt 2004) characterized as 
proprietary, distinctive, and individuative. Experiential modes in general 
are distinguished phenomenally. Vision, audition, olfaction, gustation, 
etc. are modes of experiencing, and each is constituted by its own 
proprietary kind of determinable phenomenology (visual, auditory, 
olfactory, gustatory, . . .). Hence, there is a proprietary determinable 
phenomenology for thought—what I have called (Pitt 2004) 
“cognitive” phenomenology (“conceptual” and “propositional” 
phenomenology will do as well). And just as there are differences within 
each kind of sensory phenomenology that distinguish them from others 
  
of the same general kind (e.g., green percepts from yellow percepts), 
there are differences within conceptual phenomenology that distinguish 
conceptual contents from each other. There are cognitive, as well as 
sensory, determinables and determinates. Moreover, on this view, the 
various determinate cognitive phenomenologies are intentional contents 
(Pitt 2009). 
So, for the same reason that there cannot be sounds with smells as 
constituents, there cannot be concepts with smells as constituents. 
Furthermore, just as sounds cannot be individuated with respect to 
smells, phenomenal concepts cannot be individuated with respect to 
their nonconceptual referents. The contents of my concept that smell do 
not change depending upon which smell I am attending (referring) to.14 
I have both epistemic and metaphysical reasons for believing that 
there is a proprietary, distinctive, individuative phenomenology of 
thought content.15 Briefly, the epistemic reason (developed in Pitt 
2004, 2009) is that there is available to us a mode of access to the 
contents of our conscious occurrent thoughts—viz., introspective and 
non-inferential—that would not be available to us if occurrent conscious 
thought contents were not distinctively presented to us in conscious 
experience. In general, discriminatory non-inferential introspective 
awareness of occurrent conscious states requires that the states accessed 
be differentiated in consciousness—that is, they must be introspectively 
distinguishable and identifiable as the states they are. (This is analogous 
to the role that distinguishability and identifiability of objective 
properties plays in purely perceptual discrimination.) But differentiation 
in consciousness is entirely a matter of difference of phenomenology. 
Thus, we can be non-inferentially introspectively aware that we are 
experiencing a pain, and not a smell or a sound, that the pain is burning, 
and not achy or slashing, or that it has gotten worse, because pain 
experiences have proprietary, distinctive, individuative 
phenomenologies. And we can be non-inferentially introspectively 
aware that we are thinking, and not feeling pain or hearing a sound or 
smelling a smell, and that we are thinking about covalent bonding, and 
not about beer, or the end of American democracy. But if conscious 
thoughts can be thus discriminated from other conscious states (or 
events) and identified as the thoughts they are, introspectively and 
non-inferentially, they too must have proprietary, distinctive, 
individuative phenomenologies, which constitute their intentional 
contents. 
This is a transcendental argument: a certain kind of access to 
conscious occurrent thought content is possible (which is not to say 
either that it is infallible or that it is the only kind of access we can have 
to our thoughts); but it would not be possible if there were no 
  
proprietary, distinctive, individuative phenomenology of thought; hence, 
there is such phenomenology. 
The metaphysical reason (developed in Pitt 2011) focuses on the fact 
that conscious states in general are, qua conscious, phenomenally 
individuated. What distinguishes conscious smells from conscious 
sounds is their distinctive kinds of phenomenologies (olfactory and 
auditory). Hence, if conscious thoughts are not conscious sights, smells, 
sounds, . . ., then they must have their own kind of phenomenology that 
constitutes their determinable phenomenal kind. And if the thought that 
yttrium conducts electricity is a different thought than the thought that 
robots are stealing our luggage, then, like the taste of honey and the 
taste of ashes, they must have different determinate phenomenologies. 
Now, Brian claims that not all contents of occurrent conscious 
concepts (hence, thoughts) are immediately accessible in introspection. 
This is, for example, true of what he calls “systematic” or “personal 
theoretical” concepts, such as mother, female, and child: 
We do not take in the intentional properties of a systematic concept 
all at once. . . . We do so rather by finding our way about among a 
systematic concept’s lateral interconceptual connections. . . . The 
phenomenological world-directedness of a personal theoretical 
concept, I want to propose here, derives from its intimate conceptual 
connections with perceptual intentionality. . . . So the idea that every 
concept can be revealed in an introspective glance, or even in an 
introspective stare, is not essential to the defense of internal, 
phenomenological, intentionality. 
(Loar 2003b, 2017, 315) 
But it cannot be the case that all concepts are systematic in this way. 
Some must wear their contents on their face. Otherwise, given Brian ’s 
rejection of the idea that sheer relatedness—blank conceptual roles—can 
confer content, the search for intentional properties would be viciously 
circular. And the question is whether these “facial” contents can all be 
sensory. 
The history of failed attempts to construct an empiricist 
psychosemantics strongly suggests that they cannot. It is highly doubtful 
that a theory that relies on sensory phenomenology as the ultimate 
source of all intentional content can account for the contents of, for 
example, philosophical, mathematical and logical concepts and beliefs. 
The concept of objective causal necessity cannot (as Hume showed) be 
derived from experience, either introspective or extrospective, which 
only presents us with the way things are, and not how they must or 
cannot be. (This led Hume to deny that we have any such concept, 
  
redirecting the term “necessity” to experiences of constant conjunction 
and expectation.) Nor do concepts like transfinite ordinal, least 
convergent series, infinitesimal, entailment, logical necessity, and 
possible world have sensory contents. And it is not obvious that how the 
contents of such concepts can be generated by inferential connections to 
sensory concepts. 
Moreover, even if sensory experience provides occasions for the 
formation of such concepts, it cannot confer their contents upon them. 
One might form a general geometrical concept like triangle in response 
to sensory experiences of a variety of physical representations; but, as 
has been long observed, general triangularity is not represented by any 
particular sensory experience (and not least because there are no 
experienceable triangles). The contents of concepts (the conceptual 
machinery) needed to form a general concept on the basis of sensory 
experiences are not themselves to be found in those experiences, all of 
which are particular. Nor do they arise from the connections particular 
concepts bear to each other. What is understood when we grasp abstract 
philosophical, logical and mathematical concepts is not sensory, and 
cannot be reduced to the sensory. 
To accommodate these facts, a phenomenally-based theory of content 
must recognize a non-sensory cognitive phenomenology, in addition to 
sensory phenomenology. Moreover, given the impossibility of sensory 
incorporation, cognitive phenomenology must be taken to constitute all 
distinctively conceptual intentional content. (This is not to deny that 
sensory experiences have nonconceptual intentionality.) Insofar as 
Brian’s theory does not recognize this kind of phenomenology, it is, in 
my view, compromised. It is not yet a theory that a Phenomenal 






Loar (1976, 1987, 1988, 1991, 1995, 1997, 2003a, 2003b). 
 




I have not seen this remark in print. I heard Fodor make it, and Strawson reports it 
in his 2008. 
 
4 I challenge the standard semantics of singular terms (proper names and indexicals), 
as applied to the theory of mental intentionality, in book The Quality of Thought 




5 I set aside here the complication that an ascriber’s concept need not match the 
concept expressed in his language by the term he uses.  
 
6 This section is adapted from a much longer and more detailed discussion of Burge 
in The Quality of Thought. 
 
7 
I discuss Burge’s response to this objection, which I think is inadequate, in The 
Quality of Thought. 
 
8 
See also Loar 1997. 
 
9 
I have in mind here accounts on which phenomenal concepts are individuated 
referentially. Referential individuation is as problematic for internally directed 
concepts as it is for externally directed ones. Externalism is just one form of 
referentialism (extensionalism). (Cf. Farkas 2008, 77–79.) 
 
10 
I also believe that Brian’s account of reference as an external, causal (as opposed to 
descriptive) relation will run into problems with (at least some) concepts of abstract 
objects. I develop this objection in The Quality of Thought. 
 
11 Analogous considerations are often appealed to in the case of proper names (and 
indexicals). For example, I will not understand what you said when you said “Don 
is totally bogus” if I do not know who Don is—which Don you are referring to; and 
you must somehow supplement the name in such a way as to get me on to the right 
one. And neither will you understand what you said, or succeed in thinking a 
thought, if you cannot supply a referent (Evans 1982, 74). 
 
12 
I elaborate and defend this nonconceptual account of knowing what it is 
like, what Earl Conee (1994) calls “phenomenal knowledge” (I call it 




This is what I call the Principle of Phenomenal Immiscibility. To say that oil and 
water are immiscible is not to say that there cannot be a collection of water 
molecules and oil droplets in suspension. Oil and water can be mixed in that sense. 
But oil droplets cannot be partially composed of H2O molecules, and H2O 
molecules cannot have oil droplets as constituents.  
 
14 
I present and defend a cognitive-phenomenal account of the contents of indexical 
and demonstrative concepts in chapter four of The Quality of Thought. 
 
15 
This should be carefully distinguished from the thesis that there are proprietary 
phenomenologies for the various propositional attitudes, which may in fact be 
individuated by psychological roles. Cognitive phenomenology is the 
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